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FREE SPEECH AND SPEAKER'S INTENT
Larry Alexander*
A few years ago, in an exchange with Cass Sunstein and
Frederick Schauer, I criticized efforts to distinguish "high value"
and "low value" speech, as the Supreme Court, Sunstein, and
others have urged from time to time.t Any particular "unit" of
speech, however such a unit is individuated, may convey an indefinite number of ideas to its audience. The ideas conveyed
vary depending upon what the unit of speech is taken to be, the
context into which it is placed, and the audience to which it is
presented. Some ideas may seem more valuable than othersbecause we think some are true and important, while others are
either false or banal-but we cannot locate the ideas that audiences derive from speech in the speech itself. We cannot ban
"low value" ideas by banning, say, "low value" movies because
audiences may derive low value ideas from high value movies
and vice versa. A medical textbook may be neglected by physicians but eagerly sought by those who are sexually aroused by its
pictures of sexual organs; a book of "pornographic" photographs
may be profitably studied by psychologists and sociologists in
whom it produces no sexual arousal whatsoever. The ideas that
speech evokes are not locatable in the symbols employed.2
In the same exchange, I also argued against locating the
"value" of speech in the intentions of its authors.3 My reason
was similar to my reason against locating value in the speech it* Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego.
1. Larry A. Alexander, Low Value Speech, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 547 (1989). See also
Cass R. Sunstein, Low Value Speech Revisited, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 555 (1989); Frederick
Schauer, The Aim and the Target in Free Speech Methodology, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 562
(1989).
2. This is not to say that we cannot predict with some confidence what ideas various audiences will receive from particular symbols. If we could not so predict, successful
communication would be just a random event. It is to say, however, that the ideas symbols produce in audiences are as much a matter of the nature of the audience and the
context as the symbols themselves.
This point also explains why there is no principled way to demarcate what is to count
as a unit or item of speech for purposes of assessing whether the speech is high or low
value. Consider (1) a photograph of two people fornicating (2) found within a medical
textbook (3) being viewed by voyeurs (4) who are being studied by psychologists.
3. See Alexander, 83 Nw U. L. Rev. at 548-49 (cited in note 1).
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self. Whatever the author intends to communicate by her
speech, it is always possible and indeed highly likely that the
ideas the audience receives will be different. Das Kapital may be
a "high value" work for most of its audience even if Karl Marx
meant it as a joke, or even if it was the product of the proverbial
thousand monkeys on typewriters. Pornography intended by its
author only for the audience's arousal and the author's profit
may tum out to be highly useful in sociological and psychological
studies, just as a medical textbook may end up being read mostly
by voyeurs in search of "dirty pictures." (Popular culture in particular is a rich mine of works intended as "high brow" that end
up as "low brow" entertainment and works intended as entertainment that end up being subjects of serious debate and
discussion.)
I concluded that for purposes of first amendment jurisprudence, the principal focus should not be on the value inhering in
some tangible item of speech or the communicative intentions of
authors. Instead, the focus should be on the government's reasons for regulating.4 If the government regulates because it
wishes to prevent an audience from considering certain ideas,
either as an end in itself or, much more likely, as a means to
some further end, then the First Amendment is in play. If the
government's reason for regulating is not to prevent an audience
from considering certain ideas, the First Amendment is probably
not in play (or at least the jurisprudence shifts to the less stringent time, place, and manner analysis). The government's aim to
suppress ideas is both sufficient and necessary for invoking standard first amendment jurisprudence. Once the First Amendment
is in play, however, the value of the targeted idea may be relevant (if the idea were a false factual proposition, for example, or
revealed private, embarrassing facts).s Additionally, the way in
which the possession of the idea leads to harm will be relevant
and often determinative.6
In a recent article, Sunstein appears to agree with me that
the locus of the value of speech is not any particular tangible
item.7 He rightly points out that all speech is "symbolic conduct," and that any conduct can be used to symbolize ideas.s
Thus, it would be wrong to locate pornography's "low value" in
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id. at 553.
Id. at 554.
Id.
Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 795, 808 (1993).
Id. at 833·34.
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the tangible work itself rather than in the message the author was
intending to communicate and the audience was receiving.
Sunstein, however, ignores the remainder of my analysis and
makes the author's intentions central to first amendment analysis. His position now is that "speech qualifies for protection if it
is intended and received as a contribution to social deliberation
about some issue."9 More precisely, "conduct carrying a political
message qualifies as speech within the meaning of the First
Amendment . . . . When it is expressive and communicative but
nonpolitical, such conduct belongs in a second tier of protection
["low value" speech] .... "1o
In his latest article, as well as in the article to which I initially
responded, Sunstein is searching for a way to justify suppression
of pornography because pornography promotes a view of women
that impedes women's achievement of equality.n In my view, if
government attempts to suppress pornography for this reason, it
is conceding the "political" nature of pornography. For first
amendment purposes, bannning pornography for this reason is
no different from banning political tracts that urge the subordination or sexual enslavement of women.12
Sunstein's present position is that unless the pornographer is
intending to convey such a message, the pornography is not high
value political speech and is more easily regulable. For him, the
author's intent is central to first amendment analysis, whereas for
me, the government's intent is central. Let me briefly list some
of the problems with Sunstein's view.
First, Sunstein's view fails to bring within the First Amendment many governmental regulations that appear intuitively to
raise first amendment concerns. I already mentioned the possibility that Das Kapital was intended, not as a serious political
tract, but as a joke (low value entertainment), or that it was
"written" by a thousand monkeys on typewriters (no authors' in9. Id. at 834.
10. Id. at 835. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free
Speech 130-31 (Free Press, 1993) (the highest level of protection goes to political speech,
which is speech that is both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation
about some issue).
11. Sunstein, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 804-13,817-22 (cited in note 7); Cass R. Sunstein,
Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 Duke L.J. 589.
12. Alexander, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 547-48 (cited in note 1). Catharine MacKinnon
apparently accepts this conclusion, though for her it means that government should ban
the political tracts as well as pornography, not that it should ban neither. See Catharine
A. MacKinnon, Only Wordr 106-07 (Harvard U. Press, 1993). Sunstein, however, wants
to stake out a middle ground in which pornography, but not political tracts, is bannable
because of its political message.
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tention). If government were to attempt to suppress it because
of a fear that it would give readers subversive ideas, Sunstein's
position would give government a first amendment green light.
The fact that the audience is "receiving" the book as political
does not help Sunstein's position. If an effect on the audience's
political ideas were enough to bring the First Amendment into
play in the absence of an author's political intent, then pornography could not be regulated on the feminist rationale.B
The same analysis applies if the government prohibits people from observing a rock formation because it fears they will be
inspired by it to adopt socially harmful views, or if it bans military toys because it believes they inculcate militarism. There are
no authors' intentions here, but there are surely free speech issues. The same applies to bans on political tracts written by
those, such as foreigners, who have no first amendment rights.
Sunstein's approach also leads to a good deal of indeterminacy. Conduct, including but surely not limited to the production
of books, movies, art, and so forth, will be regulable or not depending upon whether the actor intends to express some idea
through the conduct and whether the idea is "political." The first
amendment status of all conduct will depend in part on the actor's intention.14
Of course, merely because an actor intends a political
message through his conduct does not mean that the conduct is
constitutionally immunized from regulation. As Sunstein tells us,
much politically expressive conduct is regulable notwithstanding
its high value first amendment status because government has a
compelling interest in regulating it. Is That points to a third problem with Sunstein's approach, which is that the approach will
trivialize the compelling interest test. Or, put differently, lots of
governmental interests that we ordinarily would not think of as
"compelling" will come out as such under Sunstein's approach.
Sunstein himself gives an example of this when he says that political graffiti on public monuments can be prohibited (despite the
author's political intention) because the government has a "powerful" interest in "protecting public monuments."16 The point is
that under Sunstein's approach, all of the multitude of everyday
regulations which we do not believe people should be able to
violate just because they have a political point to make will end
13. Sunstein is in fact explicit that speaker's political intent is necessary for deeming
speech political. See note 10 supra.
14. See Sunstein, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 834-36 (cited in note 7).
15. Id. at 834-35.
16. ld. at 834.
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up being deemed to serve "powerful" government interests. The
result will be that any government interest-including keeping
people from sleeping in parks, preventing the destruction of draft
cards, and so forth-will be a "compelling" interest, and the
compelling interest test will be analytically useless.
Sunstein is not alone in the error of focusing on the
speaker's intent in first amendment analysis. The Supreme Court
itself in Brandenburg v. Ohiot7 appears to make the first amendment status of speech that incites imminent lawless action tum
on whether the speaker intended the incitement. That position is
counterintuitive, however. Although the speaker's state of mind
should be material to criminal law analysis, it should be immaterial to the first amendment status of the speech, at least if there is
no danger of chilling protected speech. If I know that my speech
will "incite" someone to commit an illegal act immediately,
before there is an opportunity for counterspeech, then it should
be immaterial that I do not "intend" the illegal act. (When I do
not know that my speech will incite others to illegal acts but am
negligent in that regard, punishing me may be of first amendment concern because it may chill other, protected expression.
In that sense, my mental state is material to the First Amendment in the same way that it is in defamation cases, derivatively
and instrumentally, but not because it affects the first amendment status of the speech per se.)
It is not the speaker's intention in speaking but the government's intention in regulating that should bring the First Amendment into play. If the government closes a beach because
conditions are unsafe, that should not be a first amendment case.
If it closes the beach because people are getting subversive ideas
from looking at the ocean, that should be a first amendment case.
If government forbids destruction of draft cards because of the
costs of reissuing them, that should not be a first amendment
case, even if some who destroy draft cards do so to express political ideas. If government forbids destruction of draft cards to
prevent those political ideas from being communicated, that
should be a first amendment case, even if no one intends a political message in destroying a draft card.
Once the First Amendment is triggered by virtue of government's regulatory intention, the analysis should focus on the ultimate harm the government is seeking to avert by interdicting the
receipt of a message and the causal mechanism through which
receipt of the message leads to the harm. Traditional first
17. 395

u.s. 444 (1969).
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amendment analysis largely does just this, and first amendment
cases can be usefully grouped according to the types of harm
messages cause and the causal mechanisms by which they cause
those types of harm.ts
Under my analysis, the First Amendment is not implicated
by regulations that impact speech but that are based on speechindependent governmental reasons, those that Larry Tribe would
call Track Two regulations.t9 (An example is government's closing the beach because of unsafe conditions when that closure
prevents people from receiving political "messages" caused by
viewing the ocean, or, more prosaically, prevents people from
congregating and discussing politics.) My analysis implies a First
Amendment with only one track. So whereas Sunstein's
"speaker's intent" approach is underinclusive in the respects I
have listed, my "government's intent" approach is underinclusive
in others.
I have two responses to this point. First, Sunstein's approach handles Track Two cases badly by stretching the notion of
a compelling governmental interest to the point of uselessness.zo
Second, I believe that Track Two jurisprudence has been an extremely unsuccessful jurisprudential exercise, with only a few
very arbitrary victories for speakers in a period of over fifty
years.21 It should be dropped from first amendment analysis.

* *** *
To paint with a very broad brush, there are two dominant
views in the jurisprudence and the scholarly commentary regarding the nature of constitutional free speech. On one view-the
18. For example, the harms government seeks to prevent through content regulation
include: illegal actions; revelations of private facts, confidences, and secrets; invasions of
copyrighted and related property interests; defamations; inflictions of emotional distress;
offenses to sensibilities; disruptions of workplace relationships; coercion; and so on. The
causal mechanisms can be usefully divided into those that require sanctionable listener
choices in response to the content for the harms to occur (e.g., incitement to crime); those
that require responsible but nonsanctionable listener choices in response to the content
for the harms to occur (e.g., defamation; revelation of national security information to
foreign powers); and those that do not require any listener choices for the harms to occur
(e.g., revelation of embarrassing private facts).
19. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12·2, at 791 (Foundation
Press, 2d ed. 1988).
20. See text accompanying notes 15-16 supra.
21. See Larry A. Alexander, Trouble on Track Two: lncidentJJl Regulations of Speech
and Free Speech Theory, 44 Hastings LJ. 921 (1993). The two Track 1\vo cases decided by
the Supreme Court after publication of the cited article do nothing to call this observation
into question. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. a. 2038 (1994); Madsen v. Women's
Health Center, 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
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view I hold-free speech is about limitations on the government's authority deliberately to control what facts we know and
what arguments and ideas we consider. On the other view, free
speech is about the quality of public discourse. The primary
shortcoming of the first view is that it has nothing to say about
the myriad government rules and decisions that, though not
aimed at our beliefs and attitudes, have profound effects on our
beliefs and attitudes and ultimately the quality of our democratic
self-rule and our personal autonomy.
The primary shortcoming of the second view is that it requires rather than forbids government deliberately to affect our
information, arguments, and ideas; and thus it necessitates recourse to an Archimedean point from which information, arguments, and ideas can be evaluated.z2 Government policy, which
depends for its legitimacy on being the product of the public discourse, is on this view to be directed toward structuring that very
discourse.23 Deliberate censorship, the core first amendment violation on the first view, becomes on this view a first amendment
command.24
Sunstein's concerns seem to align him more with the second
view than the first. Yet, the jurisprudential apparatus he employs-a hierarchy of types of speech, with "political" receiving
the greatest protection; the reliance on speaker's intent to bring
conduct within the First Amendment and to identify its place in
22. Reference to the lack of an Archimedean point may seem like a cheap shot. Is it
really impossible to determine whether government is enriching or impoverishing public
discourse?
Of course it is not impossible to do so from anyone's particular point of view. Each
one of us knows what would be an improvement of the public discourse-which ideas
should receive more play and which should receive less. Each one of us knows when the
public discourse is "balanced" and "diverse" and when it is not.
The problem is that there is no noncontroversial overarching point of view from
which these evaluations can be made. Would we be happy if the government decided that
there was too much in the way of speech resources devoted to free market arguments,
sitcoms, and baseball and too little devoted to monarchism, socialism, art history, and
rugby? Some of us would, and some would not. From what or whose perspective should
this government attempt deliberately to structure the public discourse be judged? The
majority's? The Supreme Court's?
23. Again, I am not denying the obvious truth that under my view, government actions also structure the public discourse. All laws and governmental acts result in a particular distribution of resources and set of regulations that affect what gets said by whom
and to what effect. On my view, however, these government actions may structure the
public discourse not as a matter of deliberate aim but only as an unintended consequence
of other goals. On my view, free speech is a deontological principle about the respect
government must show for people's autonomy, not a consequentialist one about how to
structure public discourse.
24. Whenever government determines that enough has been said on some topic, or
that a given idea is really the same as one that has already been "adequately voiced," it is
necessarily engaged in censorship.
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the speech hierarchy; and the compelling governmental interest
test for non-content-related restrictions on expressive conductdoes not fit neatly with either view. Perhaps he wishes to steer a
middle course between the two camps and believes his jurisprudence produces the advantages of both views and the shortcomings of neither. From where I sit, however, Sunstein's
jurisprudence, particularly his reliance on speaker's intent, has
no such redeeming virtue. It is an approach in desperate need of
a rationale.

